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[L. A. No. 20369. In Bank. Oct. 1, 1948.J
PAUL W. SAMPSELL, JR., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent.
[1] Mandamus-To Courts-Compelling Entertaining of JurisdlctIon.-Mandamus is available to compel a court to give a full
hearing in the case before it, although the remedy is not
available to inform thEl court as to how it should rule with
respect to the merits of the case.
[2] Id.-Existence of Other Remedy-Appeal-The fact that an
order of dismissal is appealable does not necessarily preclude
a resort to mandamus, since an appeal is not always a speedy
or adequate remedy.
[8] Id.-Existence of Other Remedy-AppeaL-An appeal from
an order dismissing a proceeding with respect to the custody
of a child pending a divorce action would not be an adequatt'

[1] Mandamus to compel court to assume or exercise jurisdiction
where it has erroneously dismissed the cause or refused to proceed
on the ground of supposed lack of jurisdiction, notes, 4 A.L.R. 582;
82 A.L.R. 1163. See, also, 16 Cal.Jur. 819; 35 Am.Jur. 25.
McK. Dig. References: [1] ?tlundamus, § 37; [2] Mandamus,
§l5(3); [3J Manuamus, § 15(5); [4J Appearance, § 22; r5, 6]
Courts, § 66; [7,9,11] lli"Qrce, ~ 272; [8,10] Divorce, § 285.
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remedy barring mnndamns WhC'TC thC' trial court in the principal
action bad refused to grant petit.ion('r a bearing with respect
to tbe custody of tbe child rrgaTrlless of the relative fitness
of himself or the defendant and regllrdless of th(' interests
of the cbild, and where a denial of tbe writ would require
petitioner to await the outcome of the principal action before
perfecting his appeal.
[4] Appearance-General Appearance-Effect.-A defendant who
answers plaintiff's complaint on the merits waives any claim
of lack of jurisdiction over her.
[5] Oourts-Jurisdiction-Acquisition.-An appearance by answering a complaint does not confer jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action, for such jurisdiction may not
be waived by a party or conferred on the court by consent.
[6] ld.-Jurisdiction--Acquisition.-A party cannot confer on a
court jurisdiction over the subject matter that it does not
already have.
[7] Divorce-Oustody of Ohildren-Jurisdiction.-When a child of
parents who have separated is living in one state but is domiciled in another, tbe courts of each state may have jurisdiction
over the question of its custody, though the courts of one state
may determine that the other state has a more substantial interest in the child and leave the matter to be settled there.
[8] ld.-Oustody of Ohildren-Extraterritorial Effect of Judgment.
-As a matter of comity valid custody decrees of the courts
of sister states are treated with the same respect as custody
decrees of California courts.
(9) ld.-Oustody of Ohildren-Jurisdiction.-It is a sufficient
basis for jurisdiction of a proceeding with respect to the cus·
tody of a child that the state has a substantial interest in the
welfare of the child or in the preservation of the family unit
of which he is a part, and this jurisdiction may exist in two
or more states at the same time.
[10] ld.-Oustody of Ohildren-Extra.territorial Effect of Judgment.-A decree o~ a sister-state court awarding to a parent
the custody of a child which has its domicile in California,
does not deprive the California courts of jurisdiction over the
child, for the state of domicile has as substantial an interest
in the child's welfare as a state in which the child's presence
was merely temporary.
(11) ld.-Oustody of Ohildren-Jurisdiction.-A California court
which had acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
custody of a child while the child was domiciled within the
8tate, is not deprived thereof by the fact that the child is living
in another state.
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pnOCEEDTNG in mandamus to compel superior court to
hcar an application for order awarding petitioner custody of
child pending a divorce action. Writ granted.
McLaughlin, McGinley & Hanson and J. A. McLaughlin
for Petitioner.
Martin S. Ryan, Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and
Douglas De Coster, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner, plaintiff in a divorce action
pending in respondent court, seeks a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent to hear his application for an order pendente lite awarding him custody of thl.' minor child of plaintiff
and defendant.
The parties to the divorce action were married in 1941 and
have one child, born on September 13, 1944. The child lived
with both parents in this state in the county of Los Angeles
until June 3, 1946, when the parents separated. The child
continued to live in California with defendant, his mother,
until October 25, 1946, when she left California taking the
child with her. Thereafter they lived in Nevada until June
7,1947. Since that date they have lived in Utah.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant in respondent
court on January 2, 1947, seeking a divorce, custody of the
minor child, and a division of the community property. The
substance of plaintiff's complaint is as follows: Defendant
took the child out of the state without plaintiff's knowledge
or consent and established a temporary abode for herself and
the child in a motor court in Las Vegas, Nevada. On Deeember 11, 1946, defendant filed an action for divorce in Nevada,
fraudulently claiming to be domiciled within that state, although in fact she intended to remain there only long enough
to obtain a divorce and then to marry William Holt, a resident of Utah. Plaintiff was not personally served with process
in the Nevada action. Plaintiff elairus that he is a fit person
to have custody of the child and that defendant is not.
Defendant was not personally served in California in the
California divorce action; but on April 4, 1947, Rhe appeared
through !,ler attorney and filed an answer. In her answer she
alleged that on February 4, 1947, she obtained a Nevada
decree of divorce and was also awarded custody of the child.
She also allrged that she is entitled to all of the community
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property of the parties and requested the court to award this
property to her.
011 July 8, 1947, plaintiff applied to respondent court for
an order pendente lite awarding him custody of the child
pending trial of the California action. Plaintiff's affidavit
states that plaintiff and defendant were residents of the
county of Los Angeles, State of California, when defendant
took the child out of the county of Los Angeles on October
25, 1946, without plaintiff's knowledge and consent; that
defendant informed him before she left that she intended to
obtain a Nevada divorce and then to marry William Holt, 8
resident of Utah. Before defendant had obtained a Nevada
divorce, plaintiff, on January 2, 1947, brought an action for
divorce and custody of the minor child of the parties. At that
time, under the provisions of Government Code. section 244,
all three persons, plaintiff, defendant, and the minor child.
were domiciled in California. Subsequently on February 4th,
1947, defendant obtained an allegedly invalid Nevada divorce.
On June 7, 1947, she married William Holt, and since that
time she and the child have been living in Utah. Plaintiff
filed the application for an order pendente lite in respondent
court on July 7th, 1947, alleging the foregoing facts and
that neither defendant nor William Holt are fit persons to
have the custody of the child and that he has in effect been
denied even the right to see his child. An order to show
cause why the order requested should not be issued, or, in
the alternative why plaintiff should not have reasonable
visitation rights, was served on defendant's attorneys, who
had made a general appearance in the principal action. On
the date on which the order to show cause was returnable
defendant appeared tl1rough her attorney and made a motion
to dismiss the proceeding with respect to the custody of the
child, on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction. Defendant contended that respondent court lacks jurisdiction
because the child was not in tlle State of California at the
time of the hearing and has not been here at any time since
the plaintiff filed his dh'orce complaint on January 2, 1947.
The court granted defendant's motion and dismissed the
order to show cause" for lack of jurisdiction."
Plaintiff thereupon filed a petition for a writ of mandamus
to compel respondent court to proceed with the hearing.
Respondent court and defendant, as rea] party in interest,
jointly filed points and authorities in opposition to the petition for writ of mandamus, stating that, "The respondent
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eourt refused to p,'occ('(1 lI,i'" Ih" hl'flrillU of the application
1o determine clIs/ody oj' 1/1" ,.IIil" 011 fTll' ~o', urollnd tllat it
had no jurisdirfion to do so, uasell lIrOIl tlw aflirllllltiv(> farts
set forth in till' affidavit of petitionl'r in support of the order
to show cause, which affidaYit of the petitioner showed on its
faee that defendant and the minor child were physica lly outside of the State of California before the commencement of
the action, and at all times subsequent to the commencement
of the action. , ..
"The attorney for the defendant, Martin S. Ryan, appeared
at the date set for the hearing on the order to show cause
re custody, and at said time made a mot.ion on behalf of the
defendant to dismiss the order to show cause for lack of jurisdiction. This motion was granted because it appeared that the
court did not have jurisdiction, for the reasons hereinabove
set forth and by reason of the law pertaining to the factual
situation, as hereinafter cited.
"Petitioner st.ates that the issuance of a writ of mandate
is proper wherever the court refuses to exercise jurisdiction
in a proceeding over which it has jurisdiction. There seems
to be no question but what this is the law, but it does not
apply in this case for the reason that it iR the contention of
the reRpondents that respondent court at no time had juriRd1'ction to make any order regarding the cURtody of the minor
child . . . .
"The court not having .1uriRd1·ction originally in the case
at bar nor jurisdiction at the time of the hearing of the order
to Rhow cause, the respondent court rightfully Ilranted the
motion of respondent Gladys J. Sampsell because the respondent court could not assume jurisdiction a.c; appeared in the
pleadings when they showed to the contrary." (Italics added.)
This court granted t.he alternative writ in order to determine
whether the respondent court has jurisdiction to continue
with the proceeding. Respondent court and defendant, as
real party in interest, have jointly filed a demurrer to the
alternative writ on the ground that the superior court does
not have jurisdiction to make a custod;v award of a minor child
when that child has not been within the state during the
pendency of the action.
The question has arisen whrther mandamus is the
proper remedy by which plaintiff may test the correctl1l'!'1S
of the trial court's ruling" tllat it has no jurisrlictiol1 OYl'r the
custody of the child. It has bl'('/J suggested tbat the rule

1
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laicl down ill Unrofn \'. SlIW"ilJr Cml"l, 32 Ca1.2d 304 {l3!1
]:31, il'; cOlltroJ]ing on this C]lH'stion and that mandamul'
is not available.
In the Lincoln case the question of the availability of mandamus depended on "two controverted issues of fact which
are to bc determined upon the sufficiency of the evidence (the
record of the proceedings in the trial court) to establish the
allegations of the petition. The dispute is not as to the
substance, but only as to the effect of such evidence. Such
issues are: (1) The petition alleges (and the answer in proper
form denied all the averments) 'That said superior court
refused to hear or consider, and has not heard or considered
said motion . . . or said order to show cause, and has held
that it has no jurisdiction to hear or determine said motion
or determine whether said plaintiff is entitled to relief thereby
sought and will not do so unless required by order and mandate of this Court; (2) the petition alleges (and the answer
in proper form denies the averments) 'That petitioner has
no plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law ... .' We find
the record insufficient to sustain petitioner in either of the
controverted issues." (Lincoln v. Superior Court, supra, at
306-307.)
In the present case we have no controverted issues of fact.
The plaintiff has alleged, and the respondent court and defendant have conceded, that the trial court did not give a hearing
on the merits but "refused to proceed with the hearing on
the application to determine custody of the child on the sole
ground that it had no jurisdiction to do so, based on the
affirmative facts set forth in the affidavit of petitioner in
support of the order to show cause, which affidavit of petitioner showed on its face that the defendant and the minor
child were physically outside ofiheState of California before
the commencement of. the action, and at all times subsequent
to the commencement of the action.•.. " (Respondent's
Points and Authorities, pp.1-2.)
This court in the Lincoln case determined that petitioner
had been given a hearing on the merits. In that case the
petitioner had commenced an action against her husband for
srparate maintenance in a California superior court, and
that court issued an order to show cause with reference to
temporary support. The defendant appeared on the date
srt for hearing and flIed an affidavit. supported by the
exemplified r('cords of a Virginia court, showing that petiti01wr
had submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Virginia
P.!!ri
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ill all action for lIi\'or(~c and that an order for her
made by the Virginia court in that. action was being
complied with by defendant. 'rllt' defcJulaJit thereupon filed
a motion, based on these facts, to vacate and set aside the
order to show cause on two grounds: (1) Lack of jurisdiction
to proceed because of the pendency of the Virginia action;
(2) the Virginia proceeding was res judicata. This court
held that "Neither of such grounds raises a jurisdictional
point. . . . The fact that the plaintiff was then receiving
support from the defendant pursuant to a court order was,
however, material evidence upon the hearing. (See Smith v.
Smith (1905), 147 Cal. 143 [SI P. 411].) The order to show
cause came on for hearing upon the complaint and plaintiff's
affidavit upon which the order had been issued, and upon
defendant's showing in opposition as heretofore set forth .
•• After receiving the evidence of the parties, as above
related, the superior court made an order which is reflected
in its minutes as follows: 'Order to Show Cause re Alimony
Pendente Lite, Costs, Attorney's Fees and Restraining Order
comes on for hearing; ... Defendant's motion to quash and
Dismiss is granted.' (Italics added.) Petitioner now contends
that the trial court, by the action aboye related, refused to
e:eercise its jurisdiction to hear and determine the order to
show cause, and seeks the mandate of this court to compel
the superior court 'at a specified time and place, to set said
order to show cause . . . for immediate hearing and to determine said matter on its merits.' The answer to petitioner's
demand is that the superior court has exercised its jurisdiction
and has conducted a hearing on the merits. Whether its order
was erroneous is not now before us." (Ibid. at 30S, italics by
the court.)
"In the case out of which this proceeding arose, the defe'Ad~upport

ant's motion to dismiss and the evidence whick he presented
to the trial court did not constitute a mere objection to the
jurisdiction of such court. On the contrary, such procedure
was a challenge on the merits to the plaintiff's application and
called for an affirmative exercise of jurisdiction by the
court. . . .
"As shown by the record, the trial court conducted a hearing on the mooted· order to show cause. It had before it and
receh'ed the proofs both of plaintiff and of defendant. It considered such proofs, gave to them ",hat it thought was their
proper legal eiTt'ct, and made itR or(l"r dismissing the proc~edS2 C.2d-16

)
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jng. This WH!;, jllrisclil'1imwlly, a eomplrtc trial of such
proc('cding." (Ibid. at. a14, italiC's acldt'd.)
In the prC'sent case the ddendant presented no evidence
or counteraffldavits. Her motion was not a ehallcnge on the
merits; it ,vas based on the sole ground that the court lacked
jurisdiction because the child waf~ not physically prt'sent
within the State of California at the time the action was
commenced or at any time during the pendency of the action.
The trial court heard no evidence and refused to consider
the merits of the case before it; it looked at the affidavit of
petitioner solely to determine its own jurisdiction. If we were
to hold that the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction based on
the facts stated in petitioner's affidavit is a determination
on the merits precluding the issuance of mandamus, the
following cases among others would have to be overruled:
Temple v. Superior Court,70 Cal. 211 [11 P. 699] ; Hennessy
v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 368 [228 P. 862] ; Times Mirror
Co. v. Superior Court,3 Cal.2d 309, 312 [44 P.2d 547] ; Cahill
v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. 42, 44·45 [78 P. 467] ; Miller v.
Mu.nicipal Court, 22 Cal.2d 818, 852 [142 P.2d 297]; Levy
v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.2d 692 [104 P.2d 770, 129 A.L.R.
956] ; Katenkamp v. 8uperior Court, 16 Cal.2d 696, 1)97 [l08
P.2d 1] ; Balconades Ballroom v. 8uperior Court, 109 nal.App.
612 [293 P. 631] ; 8mith v. 8uperior Court, 21 Cal.App~2d
160 [69 P.2d 176]; Archer v. 8uperior Court, 81 Cal.App.
742 [254 P. 939] ; MacPherson v. 8uperior Court, 22 Cal.App.
2d 425, 432 [71 P.2d 91] ; see also Golden Gate Tile Co. v.
8uperior Court, 159 Cal. 474, 477 1114 P. 978] ; cases in other
jurisdictions collected in 4 A.L.R. 582 ; 82 A.L.R. 1163; Ferris,
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, § 300.
In the early case of Temple v. 8uperior Court, 70 Cal. 211
[11 P.699], this court held that mandamus should issue to
compel a trial court to hear and determine a proceeding to
have a person adjudged guilty of contempt, although the
trial court had dismissed the proceeding "on the ground of
want of jurisdiction" because the case came within Code
of Civil Procedure section 336. The court stated in that
case that "We have examined the record, and are of the
opinion that the matter is within the jurisdiction of the
court. The facts stated' bring the case clearly within section
1210 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and under such circumstances the court cannot, by holding without reason that it
has no jurisdiction of the proceeding, divest itself of jurisdiction. aml evaot' the duty of hl'aring and det~rlllininJ! it.."
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(70 Cal. 211-212.) That case has been followed in illllumerahlp cases including Hennessy v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 368
[228 P. 862J, where this court granted mandamus to hear a
motion to tax costs, when the trial court denied the motion for
lack of jurisdiction. The court considered the question of the
availability of mandamus at length and quoted the following
language from Cahill v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. 42, at 46
[78 P. 467], "The code provides that the writ of mandate may
be issued to compel the performance of an act which the law
specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office. (Code
Civ. Proc. sec. 1085.) The law specially enjoins upon the
superior court, and upon the judge thereof, the duty of
hearing and determining all matters which are within its
jurisdiction and which come properly before it. The motion
under consideration did come properly before that court,
but the judge decided, as a matter of law ... that the court
had no power in any case to make orders of the kind there
applied for, and upon that ground only refused to proceed
to the merits of the application. If the person holding office
could thus decide what were the duties pertaining thereto
which the law specially enjoins him to perform, the writ of
mandate would be practically useless. The decision refusing
to act which gives occasion for the writ would also furnish
sufficient cause for denying it."
Nor is the opinion of the District Court of Appeal in Brock
v. Superior COU1·t, 119 Cal.App. 5, 6 [5 P.2d 659], inconsistent
with these principles. In the Brock case, the trial court had
entered an order denying an application for attorney fees,
costs, and temporary support of a minor child. The District
Court of Appeal stated that "Petitioner claims that the court
hilS refused to exercise its jurisdiction in the matter, but the
facts stated in the petition show the contrary. When the order
to show cause came before the cburt the matter was submitted
upon a stipulation of facts. Thereupon the court entered an
order denying the requested relief, 'on account of this Court
not having jurisdiction to award temporary attorney fees,
costs or support on two grounds: that the child is not within
the jurisdiction of this Court, also that provisions in Se('tion
137 Civ. Code., in re Attorney's fees, costs and support money
do not apply in this case.' " (119 Cal.App. 5, 6.)
The trial court did not dismiss the proceeding but evidently
gave a full hearing on the stipulated facts. It denied the
relief requested by the applicant on the ground that it lacked

)
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authority to give the relief under the circumstances of the
('.aBe. Since the petitioner was afforded the same hearing
that he would have been entitled to had the trial court entertained a different theory as to its jurisdiction, he was not
entitled to mandamus to compel a new hearing. [1] Mandamus
is available to compel the court to give a full hearing in the
case before it, although it is not available to inform the trial
court as to how it should rule with respect to the merits of
the case. (Hilmer v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. 71, 73 [29 P.2d
175].) It follows that if the trial court has given the petitioner
the full hearing to which he is entitled, mandamus will not
ordinarily lie merely to correct the decision reached by the
court, whether its decision be based on an erroneous conception of its own jurisdiction or an error of law. In the
present ease, however, the respondent court has conceded that
it did not give plaintiff a full hearing on his application,
but dismissed the proceeding and refused to proceed with tht'
hearing. This court should therefore issue the writ unless there
is "a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law." (Code Civ. Proc. § 1086.)
.[2] Nor does the fact that plaintiff might have appealed
from the order of dismissal necessarily preclude his resort to
mandamus. "The remedy by appeal, conceding that there is
such, is not always an answer to a petition for mandamus.
This writ must be issued when 'there is not a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law' (sec.
1086, Code Civ. Proc.) ; that the right of appeal is not always
a speedy or adequate remedy is well settled." (Christ v.
Superior Court, 211 Cal. 593, 595 [296 P. 612]; Lloyd v.
Superior Court, 208 Cal. 622, 631 [283 P. 931J.) Thus, in
Hennessy v. Superior Court, supra, 194 Cal. 368, 374, this
court held that "Conceding the order refusing to tax costs
to be an appealable order, that alternative would not of itself
be a sufficient reason for holding that remedy exclusive." (See
also Archer v. Superior Court., 81 Cal.App. 742, 745 £254 P.
939]. Other cases where the dismissal Was appealable include
Times.Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.2d 309, 312 [44
P.2d 547] ; Balconades Ballroom v. Superior Court, 109 Cal.
App.612 [293 P. 631].)
[3] Plaintiff alleges that an appeal would not be an
adequate remedy in this case because of the pendency of the
principal action for custody and divorce and because such
an appeal would take at least a year, during which time he
would not only be deprived of the custody of his child but

)
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would bc unable cven to sec th~ child, while the child woul<l
lose all recollection of his fat])('r. It is uuquestiollcU that
in the principal action the trial court refused to grant
petitioner a hearing with respect to the custody of the child
regardless of the relative fitness of himself or the defendant·
and regardless of the interests of the child. This court has
issued the alternative writ on the concessions of respondent
that it was available if the court had jurisdiction. To deny
the writ now on the grounds that plaintiff might appeal would
require plaintiff to await the outcome of the principal action
before perfecting his appeal. Meanwhile, he would be deprived
of the custody of his child and the right to see it without a
ht'aring as to the propriety 01 a custody order or of the.
merits of his claim that defendant is unfit to have the care of
the child. It therefore follows that the remedy of mandamus
is available to plaintiff if respondent court had jurisdiction
to determine the question of the custody of tht' child.
[4] The trial court unquestionably had jurisdiction over
the partit's, for by answering plaintiff's complaint on the
merits dt'fendant waived any claim of lack of jurisdiction
oyer her. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1014; Jardine v. Superior C01/,,.,,
213 Cal. 301, 304 [2 P.2d 756, 79 A.L.R. 291J.) [5). This
appearance, however, did not confer jurisdiction on the court
over the subject matter of the action, for such jurisdiction
may not be waived by a party or conferred on the court by
eonst'nt. (Taylor v. Taylor, 192 Cal. 71, 78 [218 P. 756, 51
A.L.R. 1074] ; Harrington v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 185,
191 [228 P. 15].) The question before this court, therefore,
is whether respondent court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the custody proceeding. (Dorman v. Friendly, 146
Fla. 732, 737 [1 So. 2d 734J ; Titcomb v. Superior Court, 220
Cal:-~,---40-t29P;2d~06]~)

It mu~t be assumed that the child was domiciled in this
state at the time of the commencement of. the proceeding in
the trial court whether· the domicile of the child is based on
that of the mother or that of the father.- Defendant con·The parties hal'e argued the question whether in California the domieile of ehild after tbe separation of tbe parents remains that of the
ehild '8 father or ill that of the parent with whieh it lives. Plaintiff eon·
tends that Government Code, lIection 244 (d), providing that I I The resi·
dence of tbe father during his life ••. is the residence of the unmarried
minor cbild" applies until thl' ('u!ttody of the child bas· been determined
by a court of rompt'tent jurisdiction. On the other hand, defelldnnt,
relying 011 Ch'iI Coo!', sections l!li. IllS, and 213, contends that Go'-crnJIlent Code, section 2-14 (d), applies only to the residence or domicile of a
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tl'luls that the chilU was domiciled ill Nevada on the grounuiS
that defendant acquif'ed a Nevada domicile and that the
domicile of the child was that of the mother. Under the
allegations of the petition, however, the mother was still
domiciled in Los Angeles County, California, at the time the'
California proceeding was commenced." Since defendant
has demurred to the alternative writ, the allegations of plaintiff's petition must be regarded as trup.. Moreover, plaintiff's
complaint and his affidavit in support of the application for
an order pendente lite contained similar allegations, and
respondent court has refused to take jurisdiction to determine
the correctness of these allegations.
child whose parents have not separated. These sections provide that the
father and mother of a legitimate child are equally entitled to its custody
(§ 197); that after separation of the parents, the ":father, as such, has
no rights superior to those of the wife and mother, in regard to the care,
custody, education and control of the children of the marriage while such
husband and wife live separate and apart from each other" (§ 198) ;
and that the parent entitled to the child '8 custody has a right to change
the child's domicile. (§ 213.) There is authority in support of plaintiff's contention in Lv.ck v. Luck, 92 Cal. 653, 655 [28 P. 787], but that
ease was decided before section 197 was amended to its present form
(Stats. 1913, p. 52), and the opinion does not mention sections 198 and
213. (Ct. Cole v_ Superior Court, 28 Cal.App. 1, 5-6 [151 P. 169], which
also does not mention these sections.) Similar statutes have been interprete~ to mean that, after separation, the child takes the domicile of
the parent with whom it lives. (See 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws, § 32.2;
Stumberg, Conflict of Laws, p. 43; 5 Vernier, American Family Laws,
p. 227.) This interpretation would be in accord with the rule applicable
to the determination of the residence of the ehild under provisions of the
Welfare and Institutions Code. (~17.1(a) (b).)
"Her domicile in California continued until she acquired a new one,
even though she may ha.e left California intending eventually to go to
Utah and not to return to this state. A new domicile cannot be acquired
nntil a person actually lives in a new state with the intention of
remaining there. (Gov. Code, ~ 244; Bhodea v. Bhodea, 80 Cal. App.
2d 723, 726 [182 P.2d 275]; County of Loa .Angeles -v.-Superior
Court, 128 Cal.App. 522,1 528 [18 P.2d 112]; additional cases collected
9 Cal.Jur. 834-835; cases in other jurisdictions collected, Kennan, Residence and DOulicile, ~~ 92, 93, 100, 118-122; 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws,
133; 5 A.L.R. 296; 17 Am.Jur. 609-610; 28 C.J.S. 30.) Therefore, defendant did not aequire a Nevada domicile simply because ee intended
to reside in Utah. She could not have acquired a Utah domicile at the
time the complaint in the divorce action was filed or at the time of her
appearance in that action, for she had not then gone to Utah to live.
Whether defendant may now be domiciled in Utah is immaterial to the
question of jurisdiction, for if the trial court had jurisdiction at the
time of the commencement of the action, such jurisdiction could not be
lost by any subsequent change of residence or domicile. Jurisdiction once
acquired is not defeated by subsequent action of the parties. (Maloney v.
Maloney, 67 Cal.App.2d 278, 280 [154 P.2d 426]; Boberts v. BobeTts,
300 Ky. 454 [189 S.W.2d 691]; additional eases eolleeted 171 A.LoR••
1405.)
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Defendant, relying on De La Montanya v. De La Montanya,
112 Cal. 101 [44 P. 345, 53 Am.St.Rep. 165, 32 L.R.A. 82] ;
In re Chandler, 36 Cal.App.2d 583 [97 P.2d 1048] ; and Maloney v. Maloney, 67 Cal.App.2d 278 [154 P.2d 4261, contends that rpgardless of the child's domicile a court of this
state has no jurisdiction of a child custody proceeding if the
child is not physically present within the state at some time
during the pendency of the action. Although there is language
in the De La Montanya case, supra at 110-111, that is critical
of the theory that the domicile of the child alone provides a
satisfactory basis for jurisdiction of the subject matter since
the child might be domiciled in this state without ever having
lived here (c/. Titcomb v. Superior Court, supra 220 Cal. at
42), the actual holding of that case relates to the question
of persona] jurisdiction over the parties. It was held that the
question of custody is not solely one of status and cannot be
decided by a court unless it has personal jurisdiction over
both parents. It was further held that under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution as construed
in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 [24 L.Ed. 565], constructive
service was insufficient to give the court personal jurisdiction
over a parent who was not present within the state although
domiciled in California at the time of the commencement
of the action. (C/. M~'lliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 [61
S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278, 132 A.L.R. 1357] ; cases collected 126
A.L.R. 1474; Rest. Judgments § 16.) It is unnecessary to
reexamine the holding of the De La Montanya case with
respect to the problem of personal jurisdiction, for the
defendant in this case submitted herself to the jurisdiction of
respondent court.
Defendant also relies on In re Chandler, supra, 36 Cal.App.
2d 583, 585, for the proposition that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the custody of children in divorce actions
depends on the physical presence of the children in the state.
According to the opinion in that case, however, the children
were llot only absent from the state but had become domiciled
in Texas before the action was commenced. Defendant, although appearing in the divorce action, refused to obey an
order of the court that he bring the children to California.
He was held in contempt by the trial court, but on petition
for habeas corpus the district court of appeal ordered bim
discharged from custody on the ground that the order was
void. The trial court lacked jurisdiction of the subject
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mattf'r of the custody of the chilllrell, for thl'Y ",ert' domiciled
and present in anothl'r state d1lrin:! thl' pendl'IH'y of thE'
action. ]n th(' courSl' of its opinioll til .. court stated that
"Respond('nt eoncedrs tllnt it is well SP1tll'l] that onr ('ourts
have 110 authority to award custody of children lIot within
their territorial jurisdiction . . . " (In re Chundl£r, supra
at p. 583.) Not only was reference to this concession Ullllf'('!'S'
sary to the decision, hut a similar statement in lV 01'r1'11 v.
Warren, 127 Cal.App. 231, 240 [15 P.2d 556] was disapprovpd
by this court in Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal.2d 719, 729 [68 P.2d
719].
Both parties have relied on Maloney v. Maloney, 67 Cal.App.
2d 278, 280 [154 P.2d 426]. In that case both parents and th('
child were domiciled in California and were actually living
within this state until, during the course of a divorce action,
the plaintiff left the state taking the children wHh him. It
was held that the removal of the children did not deprivc
the trial court of jurisdiction to determine their custody.
Nor did the plaintiff, by leaving the state, deprive thr court
of personal jurisdiction over him. "The court thereafter hnd
the power to enter an effective judgment for him or against
him, in personam, relative to any substantial allegation of the
pleadings. . . , Plaintiff cannot question the jurisdiction
which by his own act he conferrcd. Although the children
are beyond the territorial limits of California, they are sti11
under the jurisdiction of the court below (Hersey v. H erse]J,
271 Mass. 545 [171 N.E. 815, 818, 70 A.L.R. 518]), which
attached at the time the suit was filed." (Maloney v. Maloney,
supra at 280.)
Insofar as the foregoing statement from the Maloney case
shows a submission to the personal jurisdiction of the court
by the plaintiff it cannot be questioned. [6] Defendant contends that the court also held that plaintiff submitted the
subject matter of the children's custody to the jurisdiction of
th" trial court, A party, however, cannot confer upon a
court jurisdiction over the subject matter that it dof's not
already have (Taylor v. Taylor, SlIl)ra. 192 Cal. 71. 78; Hnrrington v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 185, 191 [228 P. 15). The
trial court in the Maloney case had jurisdiction over the
subject matter because the children were domiciled and living in California at the time the action was commenced, and
the mere physical absrlH'l' of tlll' ('hiltlren from the stntf' durin:!
a part of thr trial dill lIot ll"pri,,!' tIll' COllrt of jllrisl~i('jioll.
In the prl'l)ent ease the child was dOlllicilcd in tbis stat\' at
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the time thr action was cOlllmenced b1lt was not living here.
Thus, neither the Malolwy C8!;!' nor thc Chandler case are
determinative of the qUl's! iOIl whet }I('r t hI' domicile of the
child in this case presC'nts 8 sutncirnt basis for jurisdiction
over the child's custody.
Several tlll'ories have been advanced with respect to the
correct basis for jurisuictioll over the subject matter of a
child custody proceeding. According to one theory jurisdiction
over children's custody is based on it! personam jurisdiction
over the children'sparents. (Anderson v. Anderson, 74 W.Va.
124, 126 [81 S.E. 706).) Anothrr theory regards the question
of custody as simply OlIe of statns and as such subject to the
control of the courts of the state where the child is domiciled.
(Rest. Conflicts, 117, 148; see Goodrich, Custody of Children.
7 Corn L.Q. 1, 2; 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws, p. 717; Dorman
v. Friendly, 146 Fla. 732, 740 [1 So.2d 734].) A third theory
requires the child to be physically presC'nt within the state, on
the ground that the basic probh'm before the court is to determine what the best interest of the child is, and the court
most qualified to do so is the one having access to the child.
(See Stumberg, Children and Conflict of Laws, 8 Univ.Chic.
L.Re\". 42. 55-56; Stumberg, Conflict of Laws, p. 299; Sheehy
v. Sheehy, 88 N.H. 223, 225 [186 A. 1, 107 A.L.R. 635].)
There is, of course, no question that the courts of a
particular state have jurisdiction to dE'termine the child's
custody if the court has jurisdiction in personam over both
parents, and the child is both physically present and domiciled within the state. The court then has a substantial basis
for determining not only the rights of the parents but what
the best interest of the child is. All the basic elements in
each of the foregoing theories are present. Difficulties have
been encountered, however, when one or more of these elements are lacking.
It is apparent that each of the foregoing theories, if regarded as exclusive tests of jurisdiction. ignores important
considerations underlying the other theories. It would, however, be no solution of the problem to require all these elf'ments to be present before a court could acquire jurisdiction.
Unfortunately cases will aris(' where one or two elements are
lacking, and some court must have jurisdiction in thE' interest
of the child to make proper provision for its custody. The
principal difficulty with each of thp theories as exclusive tests
of jurisdiction is thc difficlllt~· inbE'rf'nt in an;\" attE'mpt to
apply hard and fast ru)('s of rt>!'; jl1c1irllta and couflict of laws
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to the problem of child custody. The pri~cipal cases and
most of the secondary authorities have been concerned It>ss
with the question whether a court has jurisdiction than with
the question whether the courts of other states are bound by
the particular decision, when that jurisdiction has been
exercised. The respective theories are based on the assumption that in order to achieve finality in this matter one court
at one given time must have an exclusive right to deMrmine
the issue. "From a standpoint of expediency and of achieving socially desirable ends, there seems to be only one argument in favor of confining jurisdiction to a single state; that
it will produce stability and discourage the crossing of state
lines to avoid the effect of unpalatable custody decrees."
(Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law Across State
Lines, 10 Law and Contemp. Prob. 819, 830.) It is doubtful,
however, whether the best interest of the child, the paramount
consideration in custody proceedings, is served thereby.
There is authority for the proposition that courts of two
or more states may have concurrent jurisdiction over the
custody of a child. (Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 431
[148 N.E. 624, 40 A.L.R. 937]; Goldsmith v. Salkey, 131
Tex. 139, 145-147 [112 S.W.2d 165. 116 A.L.R. 1293] ; StalIQrd v. Stafford, 287 Ky. 804, 806 [155 S.W.2d 2201.) In the
interest of the child, there is no reason why the state where
the child is actually living may not have jurisdiction to act
to protect the child's welfare, and there is likewise no reason
why other states should not also have jurisdiction. As stated
by Justice Cardozo in Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 431 [148
N.E. 624, 40 A.L.R. 937], "The jurisdiction of a State to
regulate the custody of infants found within its territory
does not depend upon the domicile of the parents. It has its
origin in the protection that is due to the incompetent or
helpless. (Woodworth v. Spring, 4 Allen (Mass.) 321, 323;
White v. White, 77 N.H. 26 [86 A. 353] ; Hanrahan v. Sears,
72 N.H. 71, 72 [54 A. 702] ; Matter 01 Hubbard, 82 N.Y. 90,
93.) For this, the residence of the child suffices though the
domicile be elsewhere. (Matter 01 Hubbard, supra.) But the
limits of the jurisdiction are suggested by its origin. The
residence of the chUd may not be used as a pretence for the
adjudication of the status of parents whose domicile is elsewhere, nor for the definition of parental rights dependent
upon status. (CI. Kline v. Klme, 57 Iowa 386 [10 N. 825,
42 Am.Rep. 47]; Griffin \'. GrifJin. 95 Ore. 78 [187 P. 598] ;
Lamung v. Gregory, 100 Tex. 310 [99 S.W. 542, 123 Am.St.
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Rep. 809, 10 L.R.A. N.S. 690] ; Blackinton v. Blackinton, 141
Mass. 432, 436 [5 N.E. 830, 55 Am.Rep. 484]; Matter of
Standish, 197 App.Div. 176 [188 N.V.S. 900].) Parents so
situated must settle their eontroversies at home. Our courts
will hold aloof when intervention is unneeessary for the welfare of the child. "
[7] Thus, if the child is living in one state but is domiciled
in another, the courts of both states may have jurisdiction over
the question of its custody. It does not follow, however, that
the courts of both states willexercis('! that jurisdiction and
reach conflicting results. The courts of one state may detf;!rmine that the other state bas a more substantial intE'rest in
the child and leave the matter to be settled there. On the
other band, if the jurisdiction of one state has been exercised
over the child. there is no reason why, if the welfare of the
particular child is a matter of real concern to the courts of
another state, thos('! court.s may not alRo have jurisdiction,
which might be exercised in thE' interest of the child "with
respectful consideration to the prior determination of other
courts similarly situated." (Stansbury, 10 Law and Contemp.
Problems, supra, at pp. 830-831. SeE' Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal.
2d 719, 726 [68 P.2d 719) ; Titcomb v. Superior Court, supra,
220 Cal. 34, 39.} In any event, there is no reason why courts
of one statt' should not be able to •• assume with confidence
that the courts of the othE'r jurisdiction will act with wisdom
and sincerity in all matters pertaining to the welfare of this
child." (Millerv. Schneider, (Tex.Civ.App.) 170 S.W.2d 301,
303.)
(8] The problem is not one of rendering custody decrees
for the courts of other states to regard as final and conclusive determinations. Indeed such decrees are not given
conclusive eti't'ct in our own courts. for under Civil Code,
Rt'ction 138, the court granting the decree "may at any time
modify or vaca:e the same." In order to avoid interminable
and vexatious litigation it is generally required that before
modification or vacation of such a decree "there must be a
change of circumstances arising after the original decree is
entered, or at IE'ast a showing that facts were unknown to
the party nrging them at the time of tht> prior order ... "
(Olson v. Olson, 91) Cal.App. 594. 597 f272 P. 1113]. quoted
with approval in Foster v. Foster, supra. 8 Ca1.2d 719. 726.)
'Vhatever proof ma~' be requirE'd for a modification or vllcation of a custody decree, it is not a final juogmt>nt. (Cooney
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v. Cooney, 25 Ca1.2d 202,208 [153 P.2d 334].) As a matter
of comity the courts of this state treat valid custody decrees of the courts of sister states with the same respect
as custody decrees of California courts. (Foster v. Foster,
supra at 728-729; Titcomb v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. 34,
89 (29 P.2d 206].) No more or less respect for California
decrees is expected from the courts of other states. If the
decrees of California courts with rt'spect to child custody are
subject to modification or annulment in this state, they are
likewise subject to modification or annulment in any state
having jurisdiction o\'er the subject matter, for such a decree
"has no constitutional claim to more conclusive or final effect
in the State of the forum that it has in the State where rendered." (New York v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 [67 S.Ct. 903,
91 L.Ed. 1133, 1136J ; see Harper, Conflict of Laws, 47 CoI.L.
Rev. 883, 907-909.)
V [9] Since the courts of this state do not finally and conclusively determine custody in a divorce proceeding, there is
no reason to attempt to arrive at some basis for jurisdiction
that should be accepted as final and conclusive in all states.
It is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction that the state "has a
substantial interest in the welfare of the child or in the
preservation of the family unit of which he is a part . . .
and this jurisdiction may exist in two or more states at the
same time." (Stansbury, 10 Law and Contemp. Prob. supra
at 831.)
Since this is a proceeding in mandamus to determine only
the question of whether the respondent court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the custody proceeding, we are
not concerned at this time with the question of how the jurisdiction of the respondent court should be exercised or whether
under the facts of this case, as they may be determined by
the trial court, it would be proper for the trial court to refuse
to determine the custody of the minor child in the pending
proceeding. It is sufficient that the respondent court has
jurisdiction to· hear petitioner's application for a custody
award. It is likewise immaterial to the determination of this
case whether defendant has been awarded custody of the child
by a Nevada court. It may be assumed for the purposes of
this decision that thE' temporary prpsencE' of the child in
Ne,·ada provided a sufficiE'nt bac;is for a custody award and
that the decree of the Nevada court was valid to thE' extent that
it determinE'd the child 's custod~'. (Finlay v. Fi111nll ..~lIpro,
240 N.Y. 429, 431; ct. Rest. Conflicts, § 118.) [10] Such a
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decree docs not deprive the California courts of jurisdictioD
over the child (see Titcomb v. Superior Court, supra, 220
Cal. 34, 39) for the state of domicile, where the child has
Jived most of its life, clearly has as substantial an interest in
the child's welfazoe as a state in which the child', presence
was merely temporary.
[11] The fact that the child is now living in Utah, where
it was taken by defendant sometime after the commencement
of the present action, likewise does not deprive the respondent court of jurisdiction over the child', custody. The respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter~
of the custody of· the child while the child was clearly domiciled within this state. by subsequent change in the child'a
abode is relevant only to the determination of how the court's
jurisdiction should be exercised with due regard for the welfare and best interest of the child. That question cannot be
decided on the basis of the meager facts now before this
court, even if it were proper in a mandamus proceeding to
determine how the trial court should exercise its jurisdiction.
The trial court therefore has jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the custody proceeding and of the parties thereto
and must proceed with the hearing on the order to show
cause why an order pendente lite should not be granted.
Let the peremptory writ issue as prayed.
Gibson, O. J., Edmonda; J., and Spence, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J .-1 dissent.
The primary question in this case is whether under the
circumstancessbown we shall use mandamus to compel a
trial court to reverse an order dismissing a proceeding before
it. This is not a case where the court simply refused to
exercise jurisdiction at all; it is not a case where a mooted
proceeding is left pending· and undisposed of; here the court
did exercise its jurisdiction in the premises upon the facts
which it found, upon the evidence before it, in the way which
it concluded was legally correct, and which finally and completely disposed of the particular proceeding before it. The
majority opinion, taking a different view of the evidence and,
seemingly, a different VJew of the law (although this last
proposition must necessarily be conjectural, since· the majority
draws inferences from the evidence different from those impliedly drawn by the trial court), reverses the trial court's
order dismissin& an order io show cause.
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In the exercise of its jurisdiction the trial court had issued
the order to show cause, had set a date for hearing thereon,
had proceeded with the hearing, had considered evidence
from both parties, had impliedly found, upon ample evidence,
that before the proceeding had been commenced the defendant
in that action (the former wife of petitioner) had left California, taking with her the minor child of such defendant
and petitioner and had established for herself and child a
domicile outside of California. The trial court had also impliedly found, and there is no room for serious question as to
the sufficiency of the evidence, that the defendant and the
child had at all times subsequent to their original departure
from California remained outside of this state and that the
defendant refused to return to California and refused to
bring, or to permit anyone to bring, the minor child from its
new domicile into California. The evidenee as to the fixed
intent of the defendant wife to permanently relinquish her
domicile in California and to live elsewhere is undisputed.
In the light of the recited facts the trial court concluded
that no useful purpose would be subserved by hearing further
evidence as to the claims of the plaintiff for an order temporarily, pending trial of the case on its merits, awarding the
custody of the child, or visiting rights, to him, and, accordingly, entered its order dismissing the proceeding. It is such
order of dismissal which the majority opinion by mandamus
reverses.
Such holding marks a complete about face by this court as
to its policy in respect to the use of mandate as a substitute
for appeal, and, if we are to have any intelligible thread of
consistency in our law on this subject, must be understood as
overruling lI{ncoln v. Superior Court (1943), 22 Cal.2d 304
[139 P.2d 13], and Brock v. Superior Court (1931), 119
Cal.App. 5 [5 P.2d 659]. If there be any ground at all for
. distinguishing between Lincoln and the case at bar it is that
in Lincoln we had a more persuasive case for reversal of the
order of dismissal than here. In that case, as here, an order
to show cause was issued and came on for hearing. There
(p. 307 of 22 Ca1.2d), "the defendant husband filed a written
motion 'to vacate, set aside and quash the order to show cause
and affidavit' and declared that he 'objects to the hearing of
said order to show cause.' The defendant's written motion
specified two grounds: (1) that the superior conrt was 'without jurisdiction to procrcd witI] thr hearing on saill order
to show cause by reason of the fact t}lat thl'rE' is anotllPl" action

I
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[the Virginia suit] pending between the above [p. 308]
named plaint.iff and defendant covering the identical subject
matter'; and (2) that 'the matters to which the defendant
... is directed to appear and show cause are res adjudicata'
by virtue of the Virginia procerdings." As to such two grounds
of objection to the hearing we frankly and specifically held
that" Neither of such grounds raises a jurisdictional point,"
thereby recognizing that the trial court erred in granting the
defendant's motion to dismiss. We there held, however, contrary to the view now contended for by petitioner, that the
question of error in the ruling was not to be considered in
ruling on the petition for mandamus; we confined ourselves
to the question, which we then deemed controlling, as to
whether the trial court in truth exercised, or refused to exercise, its jurisdiction.
In passing on that controlling issue we said: "It is patent
in the record that the superior court had jurisdiction of the
cause and of the parties. It is likewise patent that the court
exercised that jurisdiction by issuing its order directing the
defendant to appear and show cause why he should not be
required to make the payments and do the things recited in
the order, by conducting the hearing on the order, by receiving and considering evidence, and by entertaining and granting a motion to dismiss." Every statement of the above
quotation is equally true in relation to the case at bar. Here
the petition for the writ alleges that with the evidence (hereinafter epitomized) before it the trial court "refused to proceed with the hearing on the said Order to Show Cause, and
made a minute order which reads and provides as follows:
'Motion of attorney for defendant to dismiss Order to Show
Cause for lack of jurisdiction is granted.''' (Italics added.)
The cogent force of the Lincoln holding in its direct applicability to the order here involved is· made still further apparent by thefollo,*ing language in Lincoln (p. 309 of 22
Ca1.2d): "The petition herein discloses that in addition to
the written motion to quash the order to show cause the defendant . . . made an oral motion to dismiss the proceeding
and that such motion to dismiss was granted. If the defendant
in the trial court had confined himself to an objection to the
proceeding therein, on the ground of want of jurisdiction,
and if that court had merely snstained such objrction and
lett tllf~ proceedinu ~till pending, we shonld have an essentially different case: there would then appear a failure to
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exercise jurisdiction. But on the showing made the superior
court did not stop there. Upon defendant's application it
dismissed the proceeding. The effect is the same, so far as
this mandamus application is concerned, as though the suit
had been dismissed . . . That the trial judge in the case here
involved may have believed that the Virginia court had exclusive jurisdiction is inconsequential. A mere belief in an erroneous proposition of law cannot oust a court of jurisdiction
and does not establish a refusal to act. If the trial court here
had acted in accordance with such a belief and merely sustained an objection to proceeding with the hearing, we should
have a proper factual base, jurisdictionally, for the intervention of mandate. But we are concluded on this phase of the
case by the fact that the court, regardless of what its theory
may have been, in the action it took exercised its jurisdiction."
Here, as previously stated, the court exercised its jurisdiction in the premises by issuing the order to show cause,
by conducting a hearing thereon and by making an order
completely disposing of such order to show cause. Whether
such order is correct or erroneous is, as it was held in Lincoln,
not properly before us. But, in view of the argument made on
behalf of petitioner, and to demonstrate that the court did
exercise jurisdiction and discretion in the premises rather
than simply refuse to act, it seems proper to note the evidence on which it acted. The evidence before the court included the affidavit of the plaintiff; it included the order of
issuance of the order to show cause and it included the plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's answer thereto. From the
sworn allegations in such documents the trial court was amply
justified, if not as a matter of law compelled, to find that
defendant left California in October, 1946, taking with her
the minor child, and that at the time she left California she
had the fixed and definite intention to cease to be a resident
of California and to establish and maintain her residence
permanently outside the boundaries of California. Accordingly the trial court was amply justified, if not as a matter
of law compelled, to find that at the time the order to show
cause was issued (July 8, 1947, and, if it be material, at the
time plaintiff commenced his action, JanulLl'Y 2, 1947) the
defendant's domicile and that of the child had ceased to be in
California.
From the record presented by plaintiff, who is petitioner
here, it appears without dispute that plaintiff and defendant
separated on June 3, 1946; that plaintiff'. complaint (com-
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mencing the litigation here involved) was filed on January
2, 1947; "that the defendant Gladys J. Sampsell left the
State of California on October 25, 1946, with the avowed in-

tention of obtaining a Nevada divorce and thereafter marrying William Bolt and residing with him at his residence in
Salt Lake City. [Italics added.] Six weeks thereafter, and
on December 11, 1946, she sued petitioner in Nevada for a
divorce, and served him by publication ... On June 7,1947,
tke defendant Gladys J. Sampsell carried out her original
stated intention by marrying William Holt in Carson City,
Nevada, and removing to Salt Lake City, where she has since
resided with him. [Italics added.] On July 8,1947, petitioner
filed an affidavit in support of an order to show cause for a
pendente lite determination of the minor child'a custody,
and such order to show cause was issued and made returnable
on July 17, 1947, before the respondent Court."
It is to be noted that the affidavit of plaintiff, which is a
part of the evidence which was before the trial court when
it entered its order of dismissal, apecifically avers that "prior
to the 25th day of October, 1946, defendant stated to plaintiff that she was going to divorce him and marry one WILLIAM
HOLT, who resided in Salt Lake City, Utah, and on the 25th
day of October, 1946, said defendant, without the,knowledge
or consent of plaintiff, left the County of Los Angeles, State
of California, where both plaintiff and defendant had resided
since their respective childhoods, with the said minor child
of plaintiff and defendant, and went to the City of Las Vegas,
State of Nevada. That thereafter plaintiff requested that
defendant return to the State of California with the said
child, but t.he defendant has at all times failed, neglected; and
refused to do so, and instead of returning and as soon as she
had lived for six weeks in Las Vegas, Nevada, and on or about
. __ ,._.~~,!lth day of December, 1946, defendant filed a divorce
action against plaintiff in I the District Court of the State of
Nevada, in and for the County of Clark. That ser\ice by publication in said divorce action was attempted on plaintiff, but
that plaintiff did not appear in said action, and plaintiff was
never personally served in said action, for the reason that tile
State of California was the true domicile of the said parties·
• A roere conclullion of the affiant, 80 far as doroicile of the defendant
and of the ehild ill concerned, and incompetent to constitute a substantial
conflict in the ohjective facts from which their domicile is to be inferred.
(John8ton v. Benton (1925), 73 Cnl.App. 56;j, 570 [239 P. 60].)
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the place where any divorce litigation should be maintained, and for the further reason that plaintiff did not have
tlw facilities and his employment did not permit his travelling
to the State of Nevada to defend and cross-complain in said
action.•.. 4. On or about the 7th day of June, 1947, in
Carson City, Nevada, the defendant Gladys J, Sampsell married the William Holt whom she stated to affiant that she
intended marrying, before going to the State of Nevada to
obtain her said divorce, and since said time said William Holt
and said defendant have been living together in Salt Lake
City, Utah, as man and wife.
"5. That prior to said marriage, defendant continued to
maintain a place of temporary abode in Las Vegas, Nevada,
and has never had any intention of making the State of Nevada
her permanent place of abode. That the only intention defendant had was to divorce plaintiff in the State of Nevada,
and then remove to the City of Salt Lake City, Utah, after
marrying William Holt, and relide with him in his residence
in said last named city, and that the said William Holt has
at all times maintained and conducted his business in the said
City of Salt Lake City, Utah, and has never resided or intended to reside in the State of Nevada. [Italics added.]
"6. That during all of the times herein mentioned since
the defendant went to the State of Nevada, she has maintained
the minor child of plaintiff and defendant with her, and has
refused to permit plaintiff to have any custody of the child
whatsoever, or to see the said child, or to permit the child to
be returned to the State of California . . ."
From the ab~e quoted evidence it is obvious that the trial
court justifiably found that defendant, with the child, had
departed from California and had ceased to be domiciled
therein long before the disputed order to show cause was
issued. Regardless of whether defendant intended to live in
Nevada permanently it is clear that she intended to leave
California permanently. Theltrial court so found and thereupon dismissed the order to show cause. That was a proper
exercise, not a refusal to exercise, the jurisdiction of the
subject matter which it possessed. (Lincoln v. Superior Court
(1943), supra, 22 Cal.2d 304, 309, 315.) But even if we
could hold that the court erred in dismissing the order to show
cause on the facts and theory above stated it is still inescapable
that at the worst it ('rred in the E'xercise of jurisdiction. That
was, precisely, the situation in Lincoln and in Lincoln we held
that we would not use mandamus to correct such an error.
aliI.!
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It is further to be noted here that it is only the pf'nliente
lite order to show cause that has been dismissed. The action
still pends.Many times, a trial court in handling domestic
relations litigation has occasion to exercise its jurisdiction
and its sound discretion in respect to applications for awards
of custody of minor children pendente lite by denying such
applications and postponing any order as to custody until the
case is tried on its merits. In fact, the usual rule is that in
the absence of some substantial showing requiring a change
for the protection of a chUd, the courts will leave custody
where they find it until trial on the merits is had.
An application for an award of custody of minor children,
as an incident to divorce litigation, is, like an application
for alimony pendente lite, in effect a proceeding for a separate judgment which may be made independent of, or preceding, or subsequent to, the final judgment. Although a provision for custody of the minor children may be included in
either or both the interlocutory and final decrees, the provision for the custody (and support) of the children may be
modified from time to time upon proper showing, regardless
of finality of the decrees otherwise. The application for award,
or for modification, of custody, may be heard and determined
upon a record of its own and may be the subject of a direct
appeal. The order of dismissal of the order to show cause was
a final determination of that proceeding (Lincoln v. Superior
Oourt (1943), supra, 22 Ca1.2d 304, 809), subject, of course,
to the right of the plaintiff to make a similar new application,
upon proper grounds, at any time during the minority of
the child (Civ. Code, § 188). It may be said here as was said
in the Lincoln case (p. 314), "[T]he only objects that would
be attained by granting the writ . . . would be to require
the trial judge (1) to reverse his ruling in granting the
motion to quash and the motion to dismiss, and (2) to resume
the hearing of the order to show cause and dispose of it either
differently as to result or on a different ground. In other
words, the legal objective sought to be attained by the writ
is not to compel the trial court to hear and determin~ a cause,
but rather to compel it to rehear and redetermine and reversr
its ruling on a question of law [and in this case, apparently,
its findings of facts] in a cause it has heard and determined.
That it might on such rehearing receive additional pvidencp,
or give difff'rent legal effect to the evidence it had received,
is beside the point."

)
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A case which is also squarely in point is Brock v. Superior
Court (1931), supra, 119 Cal.App. 5,6, wherein the following
appears: "Petitioner claims that the court has refused to
exercise its jursdiction in the matter, but the facts stated in
the petition show the contrary. When the order to show cause
came before the court the matter was submitted upon a stipulation of facts. Thereupon the court entered an order denying
the requested relief, 'on account of this Court not having
jurisdiction to award temporary attorney fees, costs, or support on two grounds; that the child is not within the jurisdiction of this Court, also that provisions in Section 137,
Civ. Code., in re Attorney's fees, costs and support money
do not apply in this case. '
"It thus appears that the court did not deny its jurisdiction to pass upon the application. It did pass upon and determine said application, but refused the requested allowance,
because the court was of the opinion that it did not have
authority to make such allowance to a child not residing in
this state and not present in this state, in an action to compel
a father to support his child. If the court erred in this conclusion (which we do not decide), it was only an error made
by the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. It was not a
refusal to action upon the merits of the matter presented.
"The petition for writ of mandate is denied."
The petitioner would have us hang the weight of a mandated
reversal of the dismissal on the tenuous thread of an assumption, contrary to all the established objective facts and contrary to the trial court's implied finding, that the minor child,
notwithstanding the valid award of custody to his mother by
the Nevada court and notwithstanding her admittedly permanent residence in Utah, is a "domiciliary" of California and
therefore, subject to jurisdiction which, the majority hold,
the superior-court" refused" to exercise when, after considering the evidence pertinent to its jurisdiction of the res and
its practical power to enforce any order it might make, it dismissed the order to show cause. The most that can be claimed
for the California court, on any view of the evidence, is a
fringe of partihl jurisdiction. To compel the trial court to
reverse its pri,..r order of dismissal, to resume the hearing,
and, presumptively, to award custody of the child or visiting
privileges to the plaintiff pending trial on the merits, with
only partial and inadequate jurisdiction or power to enforce
its order, seems to me to be an abuse of the power of this
court and of mandamus procedure. "Complete jurisdiction

Oct. 1948]

SAllPSELL t1. SUPERIOR COURT

789

(32 C.2d 163; 191 P.2d 739]

includes not only the power to hear and determine, btlt the
power to enforce the determination, as the judgment or decree is the end for which jurisdiction is exercised, and it is
only through the judgment and its execution that the power of
the court is made efficacious and its jurisdiction complete. To
render the jurisdiction of a court complete, it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter, and in actions in personam
over the person, or in proceedings in rem over the res or
matter in contest." (21 C.J.S. 35, § 21, and cases there cited.)
In 14 American Jurisprudence 364, section 160, it is said
that •• Complete jurisdiction includes not only the power to
hear and determine the cause, but also power to enforce the
judgment; and courts usually decline to entertain or to
attempt to exercise jurisdiction intended to be complete if
it fails to confer power to enforce the judgment which may be
rendered . . . [pp. 373-374, § 174] A court having jurisdiction to render a judgment or decree has authority and
jurisdIction to mue such orders and issue such writs as may
be necessary and essential to carry the judgment or decree
into effect and render it binding and operative . . . [A] court
will not adjudicate where it cannot enforce the adjudication
. . ." In the simplest and most concise language the supreme
court of Connecticut says (Bankers' Trust 00. v. Greims
(1929), 110 Conn. 36 [147 A. 290, 66 A.L.R. 726, 731]):
"It is a fundamental principle that courts will not adjudicate
when they cannot enforce." It seems to me that, even if we
assume that the trial court could in some practical manner
(which has not yet been suggested) enforce an order for
custody pending the tlial, we should not, under the circumstances here shown, apply mandamus to compel it to reverse
the order made. .We, of course, do not know what order
might be made after trial on the merits.
Here, both the minor child and his mother, with whom he
lives in Utah, are outside the territorial boundaries of Cali~
fornia and are domiciled outside California. It is true that
the mother has .. appeared" in the present California proceeding by the filing of an answer to the complaint through
an attorney. But neither the mother nor the child is physically
within the State of California and neither is within reach
of the sheriff of a California county. The fact that the court
has jurisdiction to render .an in personam judgment as against
the mother does not mean that such judgment can be executed
upon res beyond the boundaries of the state. The child is

)
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not a party to the basic litigation, either plaintiff or defendant, nor is he an intervenor, cross-complainant or crossdefendant. By a process (If elimination, then, it would seem
that his relationship to till: ('.asp insofar as an order awarding
his custody is concerned, Jnost logically, is analogous to that
of the res the status of which is to be litigated. "A court has
no jurisdiction of rights or actions in rem where the property
in controversy lies without the limits of the court's control
and its process cannot reach the locus in quo . . ." (21 C.J .S.
52, § 43.) It is unnecessary and would be improper for us
to speculate here as to what could possibly be accomplished
if the mother were physically within reach of California
process and had been ordered to bring the child into the state.
No such order has been made and neither the child nor the
mother is available to the Rheriff in California.
Upon the showing made the order of dismissal was within,
and constituted an exercise of, the jurisdiction of the court.
Contrary to a statement in the majority opinion that "If we
were to hold that the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction based
on the facts stated in petitioner's affidavit is a determination
on the merits precluding the issuance of mandamus" some
11 California eases "would have to be overruled," an examination of the cited cases discloses no holding requiring
that under circumstances such 88 are apparent here the
writ must issue. There is broad language, somewhat loosely
used in some of those eases, but the fact remains that Lincoln
and Brock are the only two California cases squarely in point
with the case at bar and those two cases, if we are to be consistent, require that the writ be denied.
Perhaps the most serious objection to the majority opinion,
from the standpoint of the profession, is that it leaves the law
relating to the use of mandamus as a substitute for appeal in
such a confused state that no lawyer or judge will be able
to differentiate intelligibly between eases where mandamus
will lie to correct error in the exercise of jurisdiction and
where it will be denied. I think it is clear that no lawyer or
judge of a lower court can carefully read Lincoln (22 Ca1.2d
304) and Brock (119 Cal.App. 5) and compare the court
action and orders there made with the court action and order
here made, and find any substantial legal basis or rule for
distinguishing the earlier cases from this one. If the majority
determine, as they do here, that our former rather strict
policy against using mandate as a substitute for appeal is to be
so broadly liberalized, it is my view that, for the sake of clarity
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of the law with which others must. deal, they should frankly
acknowledge that their opinion is essentially inconsistent with
the earlier ones (Brock, 1931, and Lincoln, 1943) and unequivocally declare that those cases are overruled.
For the several reasons hereinabove elucidated the application for mandate should be denied.
Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred.

